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24 January 1964 
THE ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL ENVIRONMENT IN SPAIN* 
The Spanish economy, which has been ex-
panding markedly since the inauguration of a 
stabilization program in 1959, will receive a 
further boost during the next four years under 
the $5.6-billion economic and social develop-
ment plan announced by Madrid on 1 January. As 
in the past, collateral effects of this effort 
to modernize the economy and free it from con-
trols will be felt in domestic politics. There 
are no signs, however, that Franco and his cir-
cle are ready to make more than token gestures 
toward a return to anything like representative 
government. 
Except among the Communist~, it is clear 
that organized opposition to the regime remains 
fragmented and weak. There are indications, how-
ever, that organized labor, rather than politi-
cal groups, is more likely to induce pressures 
for a gradual easing of some of the more re-
pressive official limitations on political ex-
pression and activity. 
Economic Factors Spanish workers employed in 
industry abroad. 
Spain's economic stabiliza-
tion program of mid-1959 halted 
inf la.tion and achieved financial 
stability during the ensuing 12 
months. The program had the ef-
fect of permitting considerably 
greater freedom from government 
controls in key sectors of the 
national economy. Now, practi-
cally all the economic indexes 
show an upward trend. The gross 
national product increased in 
1962 by more than 7 percent and 
probably continued to grow at 
about the same rate in 1963. Al-
though Spain ran a substantial 
trade deficit by mid-1963, this 
was more than offset by receipts 
from private foreign investments, 
the growing flood of tourists, 
and the increasing number of 
Since early 1962 Spain has 
been showing increasing interest 
in ties with the European Eco-
nomic Community (EEC). This has 
been behind the regime's efforts 
to encourage further economic 
· development, and thereby bring 
the country closer to economic 
parity with the members of the 
EEC. The latest move in this 
effort is the government's new 
economic and social development 
plan aimed at achieving a 6-per-
cent annual increase in GNP by 
heavy public and private invest-
ment. 
Political Trends 
The regime nevertheless re-
mains firmly authoritarian. 
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Significant political and social 
changes are probably going on 
beneath the surface in Spain, 
but in the absence of any of the 
usual forms of expression these 
are hard to identify and evalu-
ate. Some government effort has 
been made--apparently wl th Euro-
pean public opinion in mind--tonake 
it appear that Spain is prepar-
ing to divest itself of some of 
the trappings of Franco's per-
sonal rule and move toward a 
parliamentary democracy. The 
regime has granted a modicum of 
freedom to Protestant religious 
groups and even replied to let-
ters from oppositionist intel-
lectuals protesting its policies 
toward striking workers. It 
soon terminated this correspond-
ence, however, and an apparent 
relaxation of press censorship 
in the sununer of 1962 has proved 
to be only temporary, despite re-
peated references by regime of-
ficials to the new freedom of 
the press. 
The constitutional changes 
which elements within the Franco 
regime have proposed thus far 
are very limited in nature and 
look ahead to the post-Franco 
era. Meanwhile, severe restric-
tions on most civil liberties 
continue. Critics of the re-
gime may not organize, except 
clandestinely and with heavy 
risk of discovery. There is 
thus little likelihood that any 
united opposition to Franco could 
develop. 
The proposed constitutional 
changes are embodied in a project 
for a new state organic law 
which, according to a senior gov-
2 
ernmcnt official, has been under 
consideration by ~ranco since 
mid-November. This legislation 
provides for a prime minister 
who, with his cabinet, would be 
appointed by the chief of state 
--whether king, president, or 
regent. The prime minister 
would be in charge of day-to-
day operations of the government 
and would exercise the functions 
of the chief of state in the 
event of the latter's incapacity 
or death in office. The cabinet 
would have a fixed period of 
tenure--possibly three years--
during which time the prime 
minister could not be dismissed 
by the chief of state. It would 
be subject to initial parlia-
mentary approval, but presum-
ably could not be subsequently 
overthrown on a vote of conf i-
dence. 
Under the new proposal 
the unicameral legislature, or 
Cortes, which has been little 
more than a rubber-stamp body 
under Franco, would be expanded 
and made into the lower house 
of a two-chamber parliament, 
and its members would apparently 
be elected rather than appointed 
as at present. Doth chambers 
would have increased powers, 
but would not be directly rep-
resentative of the electorate, 
since there is no provision 
legalizing political parties 
other than the entrenched Pa-
lange. Indeed, a major objec-
tive of the proposed legisla-
tion appears to be to strengthen 
the Falange's popular appeal. 
The changes proposed in the 
executive and legislative branches 
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may have been contrived partly 
with an eye to easing Spain's 
public relations problems in 
other Western European countries~ 
More significantly, however, 
they reflect an awareness among 
regime supporters of the need 
to make advance preparations 
for the conduct of government 
after Franco leaves the scene, 
in order to allay domestic fears 
that his departure will result 
in political instability. Since 
the draft law would not take 
effect during Franco's tenure 
of office, it seems likely th~t 
he will not reject it out of 
hand. 
The Opposition 
One of Franco's assets is 
that his opposition is deeply 
divided. Although non-Commu-
nist groups have made some slight 
progress toward mending their 
differences, this has not gone 
far enough to affect their capa-
bility for joint thinking and 
efforts. The major opposition 
groups--Christian Democrats, 
Socialists, Anarchists, Monarch-
ists, and Communists--might total 
14,000 active members, although 
this is purely guesswork. Their 
incurable factionalism is prob-
ably the main cause of their 
failure to win wide popular sup-
port. hlost Spaniards feel that 
the political alternatives to 
the Franco regime are risky, and 
that another civil war mfist be 
avoided at all costs. 
The Christian Democrats 
and the Socialists probably 
would have the largest follow-
ing if they were free to organize. 
The Christian Democratic right 
wing, together with the Anarch-
ists and Monarchists, persist 
in remaining aloof from the 
Union of Democratic Forces, a 
coalition established in June 
1961, of the Christian Demo-
cratic left, the Socialists, 
and several minor groups, in-
cluding the Basque Nationalists. 
The Socialists inside Spain 
are becoming increasingly alien-
ated from those who have been in 
exile since Franco's advent to 
power. Their views diverge par-
ticularly on the question of 
collaborating with the Commu-
nists, which is favored by the 
Socialists inside Spain. Their 
falling out will be widened as 
the result of a reported demarche 
recently made by Socialist lead-
ers within Spain advocating a 
post-Franco parliamentary re-
gime which would permit Social-
ist representation. Some cabi-
net ministers and high military 
officers have reacted sympatheti-
cally to this proposal. The So-
cialists in question claim to 
have broken completely with the 
exiles, arguing that the latter 
are out of touch with develop-
ments in Spain and can never 
play an important political 
role. The regime seems to see 
some advantage in tolerating 
this group in order to foster 
splits among the Socialists. 
The underground Socialist 
and Anarchist labor unions have 
also tried to set the Socialist 
exiles at odds with those inside 
the country. In the fall of 
1962 the two unions formed the 
Spanish Workers Syndical Alliance, 
---8ECRE1' 3 
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reportedly with the aim of creat-
ing a unified labor movement. 
Their agreement provides, how-
ever, that each group shall re-
tain the right to act autono-
mously. A major objective may 
have been to have secure, direct 
access to financial aid from the 
international free labor organi-
zations and to avoid dependence 
on allocations from the exiles' 
headquarters. 
Among all the opposition 
groups, the Communists alone 
appear to be gaining ground in 
attracting a popular following. 
They are thus able to give their 
followers a feeling that they 
are making a contribution to 
hastening the overthrow of the 
Franco regime. 
Labor's Position 
Organized labor in general, 
despite substantial wage boosts 
won through collective bargain-
ing during the last three years, 
is becoming increasingly disil-
lusioned with the state-con-
trolled syndicate organization 
in which it and management are 
grouped by industrial sectors. 
The workers' principal complaint 
is that the syndicates are not 
responsive to their needs. They 
also resent the syndicates' 
ties to the Falange and the fact 
that syndicate officials are 
appointed, not elected. The 
workers' dissatisfaction with 
the syndicates was one of the 
factors underlying the protracted 
strilrn last August and Septem-
ber by the coal miners in the 
Asturias. The regime's efforts 
to resolve this with concilatory 
measures rather than the re-
pressive tactics it had employed 
on previous occasions led to ru-
mors of impending change in the 
syndicates. 
However, the constitutional 
changes proposed for the post-
Franco period do not envisage 
any far-reaching reforms in the 
labor field beyond the implica-
tion that the tie between the 
Falange and the syndicates may 
be broken. Meanwhile, the syn-
dicates are not likely to take 
early action increasing the num-
ber of elected officials, al-
though they have been debating 
such a move since early 1962. 
Scrapping the syndicates in 
favor of bona fide trade unions 
now seems even more improbable 
in the foreseeable future since 
Franco, in his year-end address 
to the nation on 30 December, 
described the syndicate organiza-
tion as 11dynamicfl and essential 
to the success of the Economic 
and Social Development Plan. 
Nevertheless, there appears 
to be strong sentiment among 
some cabinet members for doing 
away with the syndicates at a 
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future date. Vice· ·President 
Munoz Grandes, Information Minis-
ter : Fraga Iribarne, and Jose 
Solis Ruiz, minister - secre-
tary general of the National 
Movement (largely the Falange 
party) and chief of the snydi-
ca te organization, are reliably 
reported to feel that "free" 
nonpolitical trade union or-
ganizations of Socialist, Catho-
lic and other non-Communist per-
suasion must eventually replace 
the syndicates. They reason 
that the greater the number of 
labor movements, the .less the 
political threat to the govern-
ment, because they expect that 
the various groups would have 
nothing to do with one another. 
Even if this reasoning 
proved to be valid, however, 
such labor unions would prob-
ably lose their "nonpolitical" 
status under any democratic 
type of post-Franco government. 
The various political parties 
would then seek closer links 
with them in order to exploit 
the appeal that the unions have 
traditionally e~rted among 
large sectors of the population. 
The Falange 
The Falange--Spain's only 
legal party--which makes up the 
bulk of the regime's National 
Movement, has been steadily de-
clining in power and prestige 
over the years, and now is not 
much more than a bureaucratic 
machine with little popular fol-
lowing. In this process it has 
lost most of the fervor of its 
initial crusade for social jus-
tice. Left . wingers among its 
leaders, increasingly concerned 
that there would be no niche 
for it in the post-Franco era, 
have recently been holding na-
tionwide meetings to drum up 
popular support. Falangist 
speakers have attacked the many 
existing social injustices, the 
inadequacy of the syndicates 
for furthering the workers' 
cause, and what they regard as 
the present outmoded capitalist 
society. 
When a substantial number 
of intellectuals last fall 
signed protest letters to In-
formation Minister Solis Ruiz, 
alleging police brutalities to 
striking Asturias miners in 
the summer of 1963, Falangist 
and syndicalist officials also 
wrote a letter urging that the 
government investigate the in-
tellectuals' charges. They 
argued that the public was con-
fused by press accounts and not 
convinced that the accusations 
were untrue. The letter assailed 
the regime's labor policy and 
claimed that the Asturias strikes 
were only a beginning of labor 
strife, and that violent strikes 
would follow .since the workers 
had no other outlet for express-
ing their dissatisfaction. It 
maintained that the syndicates 
no longer truly represent the 
working class, that the regime 
had been taken over by capital-
ists and technocrats, and that 
the Falange should take the 
side of the workers. 
A more recent indication 
that the Falange is trying to 
expand its influence is to be 
found in a mid-January public 
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statement by its deputy secre-
tary general that it is Spain's 
mission to help the developing 
Latin American countries find 
new political and social struc-
tures. 
Falangist hopes for at-
tracting a strong labor follow-
ing are not likely to be real-
ized in view of the party's fail-
ure to keep up with the . times. 
It is even less likely that the 
party could ever become a popu-
lar political force. A senior 
Falange official recently told 
the US Embassy that a reconsti-
tuted Falange would within five 
years have evolved a social 
program sufficiently compre-
hensive to win the support of 
the great majority of the popu-
lation, leaving the opposition 
parties without grass-roots fol-
lowing. This reveals the depth 
of wishful thinking inside the 
party. 
Outlook 
Although the Franco regime 
is not likely to undertake any 
far-reaching reforms in the 
governmental system or permit 
the full exercise of civil lib-
erties, it has in effect served 
public notice that it antici-
pates political change. In 
his year-end address in which 
he praised the National Move-
ment and the syndicates, Franco 
also stated that evolution was 
5 
possible in the present system. 
Public opinion is becoming some-
what bolder in criticism. As 
liberalization of the economy 
continues, public pressure for 
a beginning of political reforms 
will grow. This pressure will 
be stimulated by increasing con-
tact between Spaniards and grow-
ing numbers of foreign tourists 
from democratically governed 
countries. Of even more signifi-
cance, returning Spanish workers 
will spread the word of Labor's 
political and economic gains 
in other Western European coun-
tries where they have lived and 
worked. 
Spanish labor may well become 
the motive force behind growing 
pressure . for a gradual lifting 
of restrictions on political lib-
erties .. Because it is an indis-
pensable factor in continued eco-
nomic expansion, it is in a rea-
sonably strong position to exert 
pressure on the regime. Unless 
some democratization of the syn-
dicates takes place soon--and 
this seems improbable--labor will 
be tempted to dispense with them 
as a channel for bringing its 
grievances into the open •. It 
may more and more seek to arouse 
the government to action by mani-
festations of widespread unrest 
and serious work stoppages. Un-
der such conditions, the opposi-
tion groups may become more alert 
to exploiting their opportunities 
for unit of action. ~~o 
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